Introduction
Security should be thought of as a holistic property that emerges from an IT solution and it is therefore useful to look at how particular security mechanisms affect the overall solution [1] . This paper examines how secure hardware can be used to deliver simple security solutions and the resultant effects on the wider solution. Services operating over a range of levels from protocol level services through to third party services are examined. A common theme throughout the paper is the way these services are encapsulated in secure hardware consequentially gaining a degree of separation from the IT infrastructure to which they are connected and which they help secure.
The next section describes in general terms how simple security services can be delivered on secure hardware [2] and the resultant security properties. This is followed by the main example that looks at the security of a web service infrastructure communicating with clients via TLS or SSL. A service is demonstrated that firstly aims to encapsulate just the protocol and subsequently this is built upon to bring additional authorisation and audit properties to the wider web service systems.
The last two discussion sections reiterate the general service delivery approach and the properties that emerge relating the general properties back to the example. Lastly, the approach of concentrating on rooting trust in simple security services is contrasted to complementary approaches of locking down systems and rooting system trust in secure hardware [3] .
Secure hardware and service delivery
A fundamental requirement in computer system security is ensuring a separation of duty between certain tasks. Secure operation systems take the approach of trying to distribute privileges over several operators [4] but these are hard to manage and hence not commonly used. Other approaches may involve using multiple machines in different locations for example, keeping the primary domain controller within a separate area from the administration of other enterprise machines. An extreme example of using separation of duty is to involve third parties [5] [6] particularly for tasks relating to audit and non-repudiation. A good example here is the use of a time-stamp service [7] that provides an independent view on events specifying when things happened and that the events have not changed.
In effect, this separation of control is creating separate domains where certain tasks can be performed. For example, a secure web server platform will create one domain where web pages can be generated and a second where they can just be served. This paper describes an approach to using secure hardware to run simple security services and in doing so the creation of an alternative trust domain within the normal IT infrastructure.
This has the effect of enforcing strong separations of control within a wider solution deployment. Running a security service within a secure hardware device with limited functional and management APIs allows policies [8] to be specified defining who can play (or delegate) these roles -hence creating a separation of control. Traditionally hardware security modules (HSM) are used to create a small-scale separation between those who have access to cryptographic keys and the administrators of the systems that use them. The HSM will often be enabled by a security officer whilst the servers to which it is connected are run by system administrators.
Examining this model more closely however, there is an obvious weakness as shown in figure  1 . The HSM keeps keys secure by protecting them in hardware but it offers a simple cryptographic interface [9] where the application uses the HSM simply to decrypt, encrypt and sign. An administrator configures the device such that it can only be used by the appropriate applications. However, a skilful administrator can misuse the device and whilst they are not able to obtain the keys they can gain access to use the keys. These keys could simply be used to access data to which the administrator should not have access. More seriously, they could be used to sign contracts, or initiate transactions say to transfer money in a bank's IT systems. consequentially there are many bugs and these can lead to vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities allow attackers to gain control of applications using the keys or even gain access to the cryptographic operations via gaining root control of the system. The latest Samba flaw (one out of many published recently) shows that it is a real possibility that the attackers can completely subvert a machine and gain such access.
The HSM does provide a high level of protection on what is often quite a general computing device; albeit with very little storage capacity. It will have some processing capability often with enhanced cryptographic acceleration. More importantly, it is a very safe environment. Once running the HSM protects against attacks [10] trying to gain access to the running code, or the keys stored in protective memory. Typically, there is active protection circuitry that, on detecting an attack, will destroy cryptographic material, blank memory so that no trace of the process state can be obtained.
There are examples of more powerful cryptographic processors that encapsulate more codeSmith et al [11] have developed a more powerful crypto-co-processor and have looked at pushing various services (e.g. Kerberos [12] and file searching [13] ) inside the protected boundary. Having a high-level API rather than a set of cryptographic functions brings obvious security advantages. This paper seeks to view a secure hardware device as a service delivery mechanism where a service is strongly encapsulated within the security device hence gaining its own security domain. Of key importance, here, is to consider not only the functional stages of the service but the initialisation and hence the management policies [14] [15] [16] and therefore the way the service is run and administered. This paper shows how a strong separation of control and duty emerges from this approach.
Simple security services can be created by taking the authentication, authorisation and audit elements of an application and combining these with the use of keys. For example, a simple service to decrypt data will now combine the authentication and authorisation with the decryption binding them together in the HSM and thereby stopping administrators or hackers getting in between these critical security processes. There are many applications ranging from secure storage [17] through controlling the signing of contracts when outsourcing it infrastructure [18] to providing accountability services [19] where simple security services encapsulating these elements can be extracted and made atomic by placing them into secure hardware.
It is not simply enough to place pieces of an application within the secure hardware; it is only when thought of as a separate service with its own identity and its own well defined operational and management structures that a virtual trust domain is created. The HSM device then becomes a method of delivering relatively small security services into a larger IT infrastructure but where the administration of such services are outside of the normal administrative boundaries. This turns the secure hardware into an appliance for delivering secure services ( Figure 2 ) and therefore can be described as a hardware security appliance (HSA) rather than an HSM.
A service running within an HSA exists with in its own right -it controls its own identity. As part of the configuration stage, the service is given an identity, a lifetime and configuration policies which include who can manage the service. Consider a simple file decryption service that incorporates authentication and authorisation checks before decrypting a file. In itself, this binds together these operations but leaves open the question of who associated the authorisation checks with the file. This is specified at the initial configuration time, or more accurately, who specifies the authorisation policies is defined.
The service itself assuming the code is correct ensures these policies are enforced. The only way around these controls is to subvert the account of those who can change such policies. It is however, important to specify that it is no good deploy services within secure hardware on top of a general OS with all the problems of complexity. Instead, it is important to have a minimal (well-tested) code base with reuse across multiple services for example with common crypto, policy handling and management libraries. Now a set of service administrators control a service instead of the IT administrators. Further, aspects they control can be set by initial management policies. Lastly, to keep the HSA service administrators honest the service can produce secure audit log (by signing each event accompanied with the hash of a previous event) so it is clear who has made changes.
Performance
In the past, such secure hardware devices have tended to be relatively low power with optimisation for specialist cryptographic processing. It is believed that this is not a necessity and as processor power grows and memory remains, relatively cheap it is possible to build secure hardware devices with the power to execute authorisation and authentication policies as well as perform the cryptographic tasks. The above discussion presents an approach of using security services running on secure hardware as a method of gaining wider system security through the creation of a service specific trust domain hence achieving separations of duties and concerns. This section describes how this approach can be applied at various levels within a web service solution and in doing so looking at a range of properties that can be derived.
A typical web service requiring security, for example, on-line banking or, e-commerce, will have a web server at the front acting as a presentation layer for backend processes that would perhaps be within an application server [20] or services within a .net infrastructure [21] . These services themselves will heavily rely on a database ( Figure 3) . Typically, the client will talk to the service using SSL or TLS, at least for the security sensitive parts of their interaction. The example in this section examines the client interactions using TLS and shows how an HSA service approach can be used manage the running of this protocol and help extend its security properties further into the backend systems.
The service provider will have a number of security problems that range from simply keeping their TLS keys (that is their public identity) secure through to securing their backend and ensuring transactions cannot be inserted or information lost. Commonly, security designs concentrate on securing the network architecture, ensuring that there is a DMZ between the customer, hackers and the backend processes. Less concern is placed on security in the backend, here the administrators often retain much control and could easily create or change transactions. Gaining a degree of independence from the administrator is critical for a number of reasons including the heavy reliance on contractors; many attacks are from insiders and the dangers that exist if the administrative accounts become subverted (say by a virus attack). Independence of control within various elements of the web service is critical for security and limiting the effect of attacks. Similar properties are also a tremendous advantage when outsourcing IT functions.
The rest of this section follows through this web service example, firstly simply looking at the security of the TLS protocol with the client -addressing questions pertinent to control of the keys on the server side. The TLS protocol is bound as a service within a controlled environment that cannot be influenced by the normal IT staff and though relative simplicity is hard to subvert brings considerable advantages. Now keys will only be used for this protocol and since the service understands and manages the sequence of messages, it becomes very hard even to misuse the elements from which the protocol is composed. Security services at this protocol level see very little of the application semantics thereby making it hard for them to have a wider security influence of the overall system. Therefore, ways of extending these protocol level services to gain more influence in the wider backend systems are demonstrated. The extreme of this is the use of third party control as described in section 3.3.
Protocol level services
One of the key security features relied upon in such a web service infrastructure is the TLS or SSL session held with the client or at least it is what the client sees as security. It confirms to whom the client is talking and ensures their interactions are kept confidential and have integrity. The security of the TLS session is therefore significant to the security of transactions with the web server; in turn, the security of the TLS session is largely dependant on the security of the keys involved in the session. This includes protecting the private key used in the TLS handshake as well as ensuring the master key is protected (particularly where session re-establishment is enabled).
The TLS protocol (figure 4) [22] [23] starts with a handshake initiated by the client leading to the client defining a pre-master secret and sending it encrypted with the servers public key (alternative options may involve Diffie Hellman exchanges). The server decrypts this premaster secret using it to generate a master secret that in turn is used to generate the six values for HMACs, encryption and IVs in both directions. These secrets then form the basis of the secure channels both encrypting and ensuring the integrity of the data. The master secret and the cipher state are cached along with a session identity value -this value can be used in reestablishing or duplicating a session on the client's request.
TLS and SSL accelerators are available to offload some or most of the cryptographic functions -particularly the expensive asymmetric operations. Secure processors can also be used to ensure that the server's private key is not disclosed. The discussion here is based on the type and level of the services exposed by such devices. Devices with PKCS11 [9] interfaces expose some of the basic crypto functions necessary for SSL and TLS for example to generate the master secret and the cipher state. Whist offloading the crypto processing and protecting the encryption keys this type of interface does not strongly bind all the protocol operations together around the session id.
An alternative service interface (at least for the server side) would be to have a slightly higher level API that encapsulates the protocol level interactions rather than the cryptographic functions. The previous section talks about combining authentication, authorisation and audit operations along with the use of cryptographic keys in forming simple security services; however, when looking simply at the protocol level it is hard to integrate in these elements. This discussion examines raising the API level to represent and bind together the various stages in the protocol. In itself, this adds further control as to how the system operates the TLS protocol and therefore adds some additional protection when processes are subverted. More importantly, it forms the basis for the next couple of sections that add additional control elements into the secure service. 
TLS Services
Instead of having the simple cryptographic functions in the secure hardware here, consideration is given to running much more of the protocol within the secure hardware. In doing there is now a service (or set of services) which more fully controls the TLS interaction thereby creating an alternative trust domain controlling the protocol. The simplest option is for the TLS handshake to be run in the secure hardware this removes gaps between pieces of the handshake particularly around computing a digest of the handshake messaged required in the final finish stage.
The initial client hello message contains information concerning the protocol versions and cipher suites that are understood as well as the client's public random value and proposed session id. This initial message would be forwarded to the TLS service within the secure hardware. Typically, this would lead to the initiation of a new session with a session context within the bounds of the secure hardware with the reply being an acceptable cipher suite a new session ID, the server's random number and where required a certificate request. An alternative reply where the client specified a session ID would enable the session to be reestablished.
It is worth noting here that the secure hardware is building up session state in its internal memory. This session state will include partially computed hashes of messages, random values and eventually the cipher state. The secure hardware therefore needs sufficient memory to hold this state (for each session being managed). The session state is not permanent; a loss of power will lead to a loss in the state and all sessions will be droppedthe same as if power is dropped from the server. The session state information and keys will not leak.
Assuming it is a new session being established the server will get responses back including the client key exchange, and if requested the client certificate and certificate verify message. The client key exchanges contain the pre-master secret encrypted for the server's public key. The TLS service holds the private key and therefore gets the pre-master secret that is used to generate the master secret. Where the TLS service has been set up to request a client authentication, it would also expect to get the certificate verification message. The clients message set ends with the finish message which is encrypted with the new cipher spec (the key set generated from them master secret). The TLS service can generate its own finish message based on the cipher spec and the digest of all the messages that it has computed.
The TLS service now has the appropriate cipher spec which it can use in decrypting and validating client messages and encrypting and generating the HMAC for the outgoing messages. In this way, the TLS service would receive blocks of data ready for encryption and return the encrypted and MACed message to the server for forwarding to the client. The client's messages will initially be passed through the TLS service for validation and decryption with the data being returned to the server. Each request should be associated by the server with a connection and session Id so that the TLS service can associate the messages with the cipher context.
TLS specifies data compression algorithms as well as encryption algorithms and a simple form of this TLS service would take the compressed data and pass back compressed data. This however, leaves little possibility of extending the service with some form of application syntax or semantics as described later. To do this the service needs some view on the syntax of the messages and this is hard when they are compressed. Therefore, either de-compression should also be carried out in the TLS service or compression should not be used.
Control
Having described the basic protocol level service it is worth reflecting the level of control that can be gained by wrapping the TLS protocol handling as a separately identified service. The basic service takes control of the server's private keys and hence the identity -this can be generated in the service and its use can be constrained as part of this generation and service initialisation protocol. However, the protocol does not allow for many constrains to be specified. Policies can be used to ensure that only acceptable cipher suites are used and to specify if client authentication is required and the acceptable CA trust list. The service itself only runs TLS (or perhaps SSL) therefore; a subverted server will not be able to use the key for any other protocols. They could not use the key for arbitrary tasks such as signing contracts, or certificates -although certificate extensions aim to block alternative uses, validation algorithms are often complex and not fully implemented. Equally, a subverted server will not be able to control the choice of cipher suites (e.g. to drop encryption) or drop the need for client authentication.
Application Security
Controlling communications at the protocol level can be helpful but when considering the wider web service including the backend it is clear that the security ends at the web server boundary. New security methods can then be used in the backend but clearly there is a potential disconnect and reliance on the security of the web server platform. This section is concerned with how the simple protocol service can be expanded-whilst keeping it as a relatively small and simple service. One key question being addressed here is how a simple service encapsulated in secure hardware can have a wider influence on the overall solution.
A typical three-tier web service (described in section 3) uses SSL or TLS sessions to provide secure communications with the client but then there is this disconnect with the backend. Take the example of internet banking a user can connect, authenticate themselves with their password and authorise transactions. Communications will be secure to the level of the web server past this there is a reliance on the security of the backend systems. This reliance is based both on the trust of the administrators (i.e. that they will not initiate transactions; use the web server to subvert user passwords etc) as well as a reliance that the service has not been subverted. In the example, how would the backend distinguish between a transfer initiated through an administrator (or subverted web server) as opposed to one initiated correctly by a client.
Extending the TLS Service
This section is concerned with extending the influence of the TLS session that the user has into the backend to achieve a greater level of security in the overall systems. Towards this goal, the basic service needs to be extended so that it has some view onto the underlying applications and the messaging structure between the client and server. However, it is not desirable to try to push application semantics into what is intended to be a relatively simple security service. The TLS service can be extended to recognise simple syntactic patterns within the message structure and then to issue tickets containing the information associated with such patterns or in the case of passwords a simple function on these patterns. Such a ticket would take the form shown in figure 5 containing information concerning the TLS session and the information matching the pattern. The ticket will also include a time and sequence number added by the TLS service, and where client authentication is used, a reference of the certificate is included. Tickets relating to a particular session will be numbered sequentially so that sequences of commands can be recognised -several may be needed to authorise a transaction. Following the banking example, a ticket could be generated when the TLS service sees a particular web form (with a very well defined structure) that relates to the transfer of money to other accounts.
The ticket is then signed which in a busy server environment can present a considerable cost therefore; a ticket batching mechanism can be used where the signature is on a ticket batch with the batch containing the hash of individual tickets. Such ticket batches could then be issues say 4 times a second. This would introduce delays into the system but they are probably small and acceptable when compared to user's perceptions and the normal network delays.
An assumption in the above discussion is that a web interaction is represented by a single TLS session that is re-initiated for each http get and send. Whilst possible with TLS, this was not possible with early versions of SSL and the browser may not use this functionality.
Having tickets showing that individual requests occurred can be important but it will often be necessary to link sequences of tickets for example the authentication with the transaction. Such sessions can be created across the http requests over different SSL sessions using cookies that should be created and validated by the TLS service (within the secure hardware).
The TLS service is now configured to generate certain tickets that are triggered from specified patterns. For example, a pattern may be set up such that once an http send response containing a particular web form is seen a ticket is generated. In general, the patterns are regular expressions working on the clients messages and once matched the data (or the hash of the data) is placed into a ticket. This ticket is passed to the host server and can then be forwarded to the web server so that it can accompany the normal backend requests.
Two particular aspects of such tickets are expanded here:
Password Security
A user of a web service will often login to the service by providing their user name and password that is filled in on a particular form at the beginning of a set of interactions. Typically, this password is protected during transmission by the TLS session and will be processed on receipt by the backend server, hopefully, using standard password techniques, but possibly by just comparing it with the password value in the database. In either case, the password will be in the clear on the web server and therefore becomes vulnerable.
The inclusion of a regular expression parsing mechanism within the TLS service can be used to specify the template that results from the login form and includes the user login name and their password. Once recognised within the TLS service the password field can be removed from the normal data stream and substituted with a function (eg hash) of the password. Additionally, a ticket can be generated by the service. In this case, the ticket should include the mangled password along with the user name. This data can be validated against the password database and passwords or other authentication information is not exposed.
Transaction Security
The generation of a ticket specifying the password is just one example of the types of tickets that can be generated. Using a regular expression matching within the service any part of a web form or even a SOAP request can be matched and a ticket representing this part of the session can be created.
The ticket, as described earlier, can then be presented to the backend showing that the transaction has been authorised as part of the clients TLS session. The main issue is then associating the particular ticket with the user log in and the rest of the session. This is where sequenced tickets can be useful where the backend can get a login and password ticket from the same session as the authorisation ticket.
Consider the on-line banking example. An online banking service may allow a user to transfer money to other accounts. For such an action, they may want proof that the user enacted the transaction both as an audit record and as part of the authorisation of the transaction. A combination of two linked tickets: the first containing the user name and their mangled password; the second describing the transfer amount, source and destination accounts; provide evidence to the bank. These tickets could even form the authorisation in other systems run elsewhere in the bank -particularly when the IT for the on-line service is outsourced.
The tickets provide two factors for the backend process -firstly, they provide a method of linking the TLS session with the transaction that can be verified before the transaction is enacted. Secondly, the sequences of tickets provide an audit trail that is directly linked to the user's interactions. This linkage is based on the TLS service being encapsulated and thereby having a trust domain that is independent from the normal IT infrastructure.
Extended Application Security
The examples have shown how authorisation tickets can be generated by a relatively simple extension to a service operating the protocol. These tickets have the effect of strengthening the end-to-end security within the backend in that the convert the client's communications into secured authorisation tickets. This does not achieve end-to-end security in that the backend system consuming the tickets still need to secure. These backend systems in themselves must be secured -for example, the administrator can now not insert transactions at the web server level but what can the do with access to the systems that control the actual transfer. A similar approach can be used in that simple security services can be removed from the base applications, encapsulated and protected -once these consume the authorisation tickets the service based roots of trust start to join up.
TLS Service domain
It is interesting to examine the domain of the TLS service in more detail. The TLS service is loaded into the secure hardware during a service configuration stage. The software is loaded outside of the control of the normal IT infrastructure and as part of the loading process; the service generates a RSA key pair that is then certified. The private key is retained within the service -it enables data to be sent securely to the TLS service and it is used to sign tickets.
Part of the certification process should also involve the specification of the service controller. The service will offer a limited management API and the service controller (or those specified by the controller) will be the only people whose requests will be enacted.
Once the service is running and positioned within the IT infrastructure, the service controller can get the service to create a RSA key pair to act as the TLS identity. This will result in a certificate request being generated and this would be certified in the usual manner. Along with the certificate, the controller can set a bunch of policies concerning both protocol level controls and ticket generation patterns. The service controller can later change these configurations.
The service controller would probably be identified using their private key and associated certificate. On configuring or changing the configuration of the TLS service, they would first contact the service to initiate an update protocol. The TLS service responds with a nonce that the controller combines with the request before signing this structure. The TLS service then receives this configuration information, checks it corresponds to a recently generated configuration update nonce and matches the initially configured service policies as a valid configuration update. The controller need, therefore, not be local to the system -they could be elsewhere in the company (e.g. in the audit department) or they could even be within a third party.
The important message from this discussion is that a service encapsulated within secure hardware and offering a limited API can be used to create an alternative trust domain. During the configuration stage, the service provider can define who controls the service and the policies under which it is run. This allows the creation of strong separations of duty and control.
Service as a third party
The above discussion introduces the idea that once the service is encapsulated it can be remotely controlled and this control can even be from a third party. Third party services [5] can be very important acting as independent witnesses in a variety of transactions. The use of tickets as an evidence trail demonstrating that a client really made a request can be important but becomes far more compelling if this ticket is generated outside the control of either the client or server.
As well as generating tickets that match particular patterns, end of session tickets can also be generated -either as a session end is detected or as a result of a timeout within the session cache. This session receipt would then contain a hash of all traffic, or hashes of all client traffic and all server traffic. The receipt would be signed along with a time (from an internal HSA clock) by the TLS service. It can now be given to the client and server and if the service is initiated as a third party (of good name); it is likely to be trusted by both.
Such a receipt would firstly record that a transaction took place and would contain information that links into the individual tickets. Secondly, either party could save the complete text of the interaction or enough to recreate it -this would then provide proof of what was said. A slight modification can be made in that the receipt could also include removed or separate sections identifying the bytes removed and the hash of these bytes. This ensures that passwords can be removed and that they do not remain in the audit log.
This now becomes equivalent to a service provider, say a bank, recording a transaction with a call centre. It opens up the possibility of the user of an internet bank to prove that they did authorise a transaction or change payment instructions.
Having described the TLS service as a third party service, which is completely under the control of the third party may not be the most desirable separation of duty. The TLS service provider needs to be in overall control but they are not necessarily the ones who should be controlling the ticket generation policies. For example, the TLS service provider would provide the service context for a bank to operate a TLS session with the necessary constraints so they can issue tickets and receipts. The Bank would have control of the RSA keys and the ability to set policies over what is ticketed for sessions involving these keys. A set of service level policies configured by the overall service controller can be used to specify how control is delegated.
HSA Solutions
This paper proposes the use of secure hardware based services as a mechanism for delivering security into solutions. Because the hardware can be trusted, the services become roots of trust in the wider solution. The example given above starts by rooting trust in the way a secure protocol is run but the scope is then widened allowing certified information to be disseminated throughout backend IT systems. In doing so, the service is providing trust in authorisation tickets even to the extent that they can be used to form a strong audit or evidence trail for dispute resolution.
The example given is one of a set of such services that can be used to have a wider effect on the overall system. These range from simple time-stamping services that tightly integrate into an IT infrastructure through secure storage solutions to accountability services say for electronic patient records [17] , [19] . At the heart of all these solutions are services that combine elements of authorisation, authentication and audit along with key usage in a service run in secure hardware so that the service becomes atomic from the point of view of the rest of the infrastructure.
One of the key features of such services is the way an alternative trust domain is created and that this trust domain remains strong even when deployed. The discussion of the TLS service in section 3.4.2 illustrated how such domains are created:
A service is placed on the secure hardware device.
The service configuration is initiated. Here a range of service policies are set. These define a service controller, tasks they can perform and perhaps the lifetime of the service.
The service instance with its configuration is then given a strong identity.
The service code along with configuration policies defines what can be done with the service. These policies may allow a service controller to delegate certain rights but the domain of control is very much centred on that service controller and the limited functionality they are provided by the service API.
Discussion
This final section contrasts the HSA approach to those used in typical IT deployments. There is specific discussion of other approaches to rooting trust in hardware such as that proposed by TCPA [3] . To be clear, it is not claimed that the HSA approach removes the need for the security schemes in these situations but rather it provides an additional security feature in certain circumstances. The discussion does aim to demonstrate how the trust relationships change on using HSA based services.
Consider a secure web service platform that may be deployed. It will be designed with a DMZ between the outside and the backend servers along with the appropriate firewalls and screening routers. The backend system may well be locked down removing as many rights as possible with tightly configured database systems. However, such systems are complex it is easy to make configuration mistakes, the software is complex and likely to contain many bugs. These factors are likely to lead to vulnerabilities.
A deployment where security is a concern is likely to be placed in a machine room with physical controls placed limiting access to the administrators. This is because administrators have huge power to observe systems, look at data and change their configurations. Audit solutions can help reduce the likelihood that the administrators can change the systems unnoticed but audit logs are often unsecured.
Other hardware-based solutions such as TCPA build trust up from the ground upwards. The trusted platform module within the TCPA specification offers three features allowing trust in the overall system to be built. Firstly, it gives each machine an identity; secondly, the TPM can be used to protect cryptographic keys. Lastly, the TPM acts as a root of measurements that can be used to ensure the correct versions of systems have booted and are running. The approach can helps solidify the locked down platforms but they are still complex.
The use of HSA based services does not prevent or compromise these attempts to build trust from the ground up in a complex system. Instead, the HSA provides a domain in which certain functions can run with the management policies strongly defined when the service is initially configured. This all ensures the service running within the HSA does as promised and due to its simplicity becomes hard to subvert.
Conclusion
This paper has described the use of an instance of an HSA based service that helps in securely managing a TLS session and more importantly extends the control of the session out into the backend-even providing an receipting mechanism to share receipts with the clients.
This example demonstrates how simple security services running within secure hardware can be used to deliver elements of control and separation of duty within a typical IT installation. The paper has demonstrated how this service delivery mechanism creates allows a service to create its own virtual trust domain outside of the control of administrators or subverted IT systems.
